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Abstract 
  
Since 1992, a new Chinese innovation system has been emerging in terms of 
university-industry-government relations. In recent years, science parks, incubators, 
and high-tech development zones have been provided with strong incentives. The 
commitment of the Chinese government to the further introduction of a market 
economy has been elaborated with a focus on the knowledge-base. The model of 
institutional adjustments has been replaced with systemic and evolutionary thinking 
about niche development and human resource management. Government 
interventions remain important for interfacing knowledge-based developments with 
those on the market. For example, new legislation on issues of “intellectual property 
rights” is crucial to the absorption of venture capital into these developments. 
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Introduction 
  
In a comprehensive collection of comparative studies of “national innovation 
systems,” Richard Nelson (1993)1 did not include a chapter about Mainland China. 
Although the construction of a national innovation system in the People’s Republic 
can be traced back to 1978 (when the Cultural Revolution ended), major decisions 
about the establishment of a market economy ‘system’ were not taken until the 14th 
National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party in 1992.  
  
While the period of 1985-1992 can be characterized in terms of “structural 
adjustments”, the deliberate decision “to rejuvenate the country through science and 
education” implied the use of evolutionary systems thinking about human resource 
management and the restructuring of institutional relations among universities, 
industry, and government.2 The expansion and commercialization of the Internet after 
1995 boosted the modernization process. Universities play an increasingly important 
role in the transformation of Chinese society towards a knowledge-based economy. 
  
  
Start-up firms 
  
“We started our enterprise in August 1998 when we were ten graduate students at 
Tsinghua University. However, we all graduated in 1999; two of us then left for the 
U.S. and two other students joined the company. Nowadays (that is, August 2000), we 
have 61 employees and we expect to have net sales of more then 10 million Yuan1 
during the fiscal year 2000. Our capital assets have grown from 0.5 million Yuan to 
over two million.”  
  
Huan Yu Xun is one of the ten students who created Beijing Smartdot Tech. Co., Ltd. 
Nowadays, he sees the fast rate of growth of his company as its major problem. As an 
SME located within the Science Park of the prestigious Tsinghua University, the 
company is still able to hire Master’s and Ph.D. students. But the success is so great 
that the firm will soon outgrow the buildings of the Science Park. (They are currently 
paying a rent of Yuan 8400 / month to the Science Park.) What will happen if this 
growth continues in the next few years is almost inconceivable. They already have to 
rethink the whole enterprise, and they may have to become much more business-
oriented (as opposed to knowledge-oriented). 
  
China suffered from the Asia crisis precisely during the period of the ascent of such 
SMEs as Smartdot. Two factors, however, have mitigated the crisis. Unlike the other 
Asian economies, the Chinese Yuan is not yet completely convertible so that the 
government has kept a handle on speculative capital transfers. Second, the provision 
of venture capital—although available—is often so difficult that these ten students 
decided to invest Yuan 50,000 each in their own company by borrowing money from 
family and friends. 
  
These advantages and disadvantages are typical for the Chinese situation. Do these 
conditions provide a competitive edge? On the one hand, the state is present much 
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more prominently than in the West, since the central government itself orchestrates 
“the transition to the market economy.” During the last few years, the means of this 
orchestration have included the development and exploitation of the knowledge 
capacities in the human resource base. Both public research institutes and universities 
have increasingly been functionalized to stimulate the economic development of the 
country. 
  
On the other hand, the political system itself had to be further developed to 
accommodate the requirements of the complex dynamics of a knowledge-based 
economy. As Wang Hongjia, a director of the new Zongguancun Science Park in 
Beijing, explains: the Chinese government has supplied two billion Yuan of venture 
capital to the Park, but most of the money has not yet been used. Although this money 
can be used, it cannot be owned, and therefore the efficiency of the transfer is often 
complicated. 
  
Intellectual property rights are one of the major issues in knowledge-based innovation 
systems everywhere. But in China—as against the older market economies—there are 
no established practices for handling the intricacies involved in the transfer of 
knowledge.3 “Who owns what?” is difficult to determine in the case of the failure of a 
new business and also in the event of its success. Which part should go to the 
university? While universities in the U.S. and Western Europe have experience in 
such cases,4 legislation is lagging behind in the PRC? The exemption from tax for 
start-up firms (which remains the main instrument for stimulating SMEs) is valid only 
for three years. Although start-ups can profit for another three years from a reduced 
rate, in some sectors it is difficult to make a profit even within a period of five or six 
years.  
  
The success rate of the SMEs in the Beijing area is estimated by our informant (Wang 
Hongjia) at 30 percent, that is, 600 high-tech corporations during the last ten years, in 
the northwest corner of the Beijing area where the main center of Chinese Academy 
of Science and more than ten universities are located (including the two major 
universities, that is Peking University and Tsinghua University). The mere size of the 
operation of this so-called “high-tech development zone” is beyond imagination of the 
European visitor.  
  
The total area of the Zongguancun Science Park contains 39 member universities. The 
number of employees is now over 200,0000 and still increasing rapidly. According tot 
the statistics of 1998, there were 173,000 employees, of whom 7.6% had obtained 
Ph.D. and Master’s degrees, 35.7% Bachelor’s degrees, and another 22.0% had 
graduated from junior colleges and technical secondary schools. The whole enterprise 
is deeply rooted into the scientific community by deliberate policies. Of the 383 
members of the Scientific Board, 300 are based in the Academy of Science and the 
Academy of Engineers, that is, they are among the top-level scientists and engineers 
of the People’s Republic. 
  
The development of the Zongguancun Science Park which integrates five existing 
science parks in the Beijing region is a recent development. The formal decisions 
were taken only in 1999, and most of the budget is not yet used in the operations.  The 
management centre is not even located on the spot, since the office buildings are still 
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under construction. But the development is managed on-the-fly, as is now more 
common in the Chinese innovation system. The “high-tech development zones” are 
constructed on the basis of principles similar to the “free zones” which were 
functional in opening the Chinese economy during the first half of the 1990s. The 
latter were business-oriented, while the new developments are knowledge-intensive. 
  
Fifty-three “high-tech development zones” have now been established throughout the 
country. Like the Zongguancun Science Park, they can count on government support 
in order to solve problems at the interfaces between the economic forces of the 
market, legislation, and knowledge input. The Chinese government has chosen the 
role of making the political system supportive of the introduction of a market 
economy and a knowledge-based society. This role is consistent with the professed 
role of the communist party as the main agent of change and modernization in an 
otherwise still developing country. Yet, the obstacles may be as big as the 
opportunities. 
  
  
Historical developments  
  
One can distinguish different phases in the recent history of the political economy of 
China. After the Cultural Revolution, the first phase (1978-1985) emphasized the 
institutional reconstruction of the science & technology system. The focus in public 
policy shifted only gradually away from regarding the “class struggle as the central 
task” to a programme of “modernization” and “economic construction”. The 
reconstruction of an S&T system and a focus on human resource management (e.g., 
higher education) were accordingly central to this period of institution building. Many 
research institutions which are still active, were founded in the 1978-1985 period. 
  
The second period (1985-1991) can be characterized in terms of structural and 
institutional adjustments within the S&T system to the exigencies of market forces.5 
Among other things, competition was introduced and institutions were increasingly 
evaluated and changed to improve their performance. The High-tech Research and 
Development Program (Program 863) was launched in 1986. The first incubator 
thereafter emerged in 1987 in Wuha. The national high-tech development zone—the 
Beijing New-tech Development Trial Zone (which functioned as the predecessor of 
the Zhongguancun Science Park)—was launched by the government during this 
period of institutional reforms.  
  
New relations (e.g., liaison offices) were established in the inter-institutional sphere, 
but the system of institutions and institutional relations had not yet been challenged in 
terms of its capacity to respond to new political and economic goals. After the 
Tienanmen Square incidents and, more generally, after the hampering of the reforms 
in the period 1988-1991, a more revolutionary transformation was proclaimed in 
1992. This reform was formulated in terms of “state-coordinated, industry-dominant.” 
The functions of the state and its apparatuses should themselves now be reshaped to 
support the market-economic development of the country. For example, 242 research 
institutes which belonged to the various ministries, have now changed their status into 
enterprises. Only last year, about twenty new science parks were certified at 
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university campuses by the government. The goal is to set up more than one hundred 
university science parks all over the country in the near future. 
  
One should note the differences from the Western model. The Chinese approach is 
always systemic, and the mere size of the operation is astounding because of the rate 
of replication available to relative successes. The function of the national government 
remains central, even in the process of devolution. The transition is considered to 
require political intervention and new legislation continuously, since the old 
institutions cannot be expected to change their functions without resistance. Thus, the 
state remains an important agent of change. However, the mode of operation has 
changed from a top-down and ex ante planning to a bottom-up receiving of signals 
from the market forces and an ex post regulation whenever government intervention 
seems necessary.  
  
The strong state has the potential advantage of regulation. Among other things, one 
wishes to prevent the emergence of extreme poverty, as, for example, in Latin 
America. The Chinese population seems to enjoy the consumerist values which are 
now replacing the ideals of an egalitarian paradise. Already during the period of the 
experiments with “free zones”, neo-evolutionary concepts like “niche management” 
and “human resource management” were actively used in the politically-guided 
development of new business activities, for example, on the eastern shore around 
Hong Kong and Shanghai.6 Evolutionary theorizing (Marx, Schumpeter) facilitated 
the idea of considering the dynamics as complex in terms of modes of operation that 
can be differentiated functionally. From this perspective, the main problems have to 
be solved at the relevant interfaces.  
  
The adjustment process and the restructurings require contributions from the 
academic community, but the changes in the latter’s functions feed back onto the 
carrying agencies. Roles have continuously to be redefined with respect to further 
development. One major problem, for example, has been the devolution of the (large) 
Public Research Institutes. After a period of stabilization of budgets, these institutes 
were increasingly given the task of “facing the market”, for example, by making a 
substantial percentage of their (lump-sum) budget conditional on their commercial 
success.  Thus, the transformation process no longer focuses on changing the 
functional roles of existing institutions, but on shaping an innovation system with 
functional components into a “state-coordinated, industry-dominant” mode of 
production. 
  
  
Towards a knowledge-based economy 
  
Perhaps China has been extremely fortunate in taking these steps in the period when 
the Internet was emerging. Although the Internet also created political problems—for 
example, by allowing users free access to Western sources of information, while CNN 
and BBC are still not included in the cable packages of large cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai—the combination of Intranet en Internet resources has provided a wealth of 
opportunity for Chinese research, development, and business. The above-mentioned 
firm of Smartdot, for example, has specialized in knowledge management among 
databases at the interfaces between Intranet and Internet configurations.  
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During this process—driven by the government—the transformed institutions gain 
momentum and are then provided with increasing autonomy. The idea is to make the 
sources of finance multi-channel and multi-level so as to increase the internal 
complexity of the organization, i.e., its buffering capacity in rapidly changing 
environments, as well as its knowledge-intensity and potential contribution to further 
modernization. Although government expenditure in R&D decreased as a percentage 
of GNP during most of the 1990s, the total volume of R&D has nevertheless 
increased considerably.  
  
The knowledge-base of the economy is prominently present. It is visible in the 
numerous new buildings which are constructed in the neighbourhood of university 
campuses. But it is also present in policy formulations. The intellectual resource base 
is to be combined with the ingenuity of Chinese businessmen on the markets in order 
to give the economy a leading edge. While the ten entrepreneurs of Smartdot at 
Beijing identify with professional values more than with commercial ones, the 
explosion of commerce and consumerism in an otherwise developing society is most 
impressive in the new business areas in Pudong, across the Hangpo river in Shanghai. 
University-industry-government relations are challenged to keep this development 
progressive and balanced. 
  
  
Conclusions 
  
The construction of a Chinese innovation system has been favoured by the increasing 
knowledge-intensity of the economy, the internal resources of the academic system 
(e.g., the sheer number of academicians, students, and intellectuals), the return from 
abroad of (especially U.S.) academics, and the firm commitment of the national 
government to the creation of a market economy. The deliberate coupling of the 
legislation system to the functional requirements of a knowledge-based economy has 
made it possible for the authorities to postpone more difficult political debates 
concerning further democratization, the unification of China, etc. by focusing on 
economic reforms. One prefers to begin with the problems which are most likely to 
prove soluble.  
  
This policy has been successful in the case of the unification with Hong Kong, but it 
remains to be seen whether a system with such an established strong overlay of 
university-industry-government relations will ever be able to unite with the more 
entrepreneurial mode of production of Taiwan. From a Western perspective, one 
would like to see the further development of a pluriform and multi-party democracy. 
Yet, what we are witnessing nowadays in China, in our opinion, is the most important 
transition of a political economy ever performed under the conditions of peace. The 
transition is not without coercion, but there is no threat of civil war or instability in 
the society which might lead to a coup d’état, etc. The transformation is firmly guided 
by the communist state, but in a social-democratic mode. It seems to us that this can 
be considered as a major achievement. 
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